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Preface
In a recent article entitled ‘The Mind-Body Problem at Century’s
Turn’,1 one of the leading thinkers in contemporary philosophy of
mind, Jaegwon Kim, observes that ‘[t]hrough much of the twentieth
century, especially during the second half, debates over the mind-
body problem were shaped by physicalism’, that is, the metaphysical
belief that ‘all things that exist in this world are bits of matter and
structures aggregated out of bits of matter’. Once this metaphysical
framework is accepted, Kim goes on to say, then ‘the foremost meta-
physical problem about the mind is where in the physical world our
minds fit – in fact, whether minds have a place in such an austerely
physical world at all’ (129).
Kim has his own view as to how minds can be accommodated
within a physical universe. His suggestion is that the most salient fea-
tures of consciousness – cognitive intentional states like belief, desire,
or memory – can be coherently integrated within a physicalist world-
view bymeans of functional reductions, that is, by re-conceptualising
them in terms of the causal work they are supposed to do. To illus-
trate: part of the causal work of my belief that fire burns is to keep
my body at a reasonable distance from it; thus, a capability to
perform this function would be an essential part of any definition
of what it is to believe that fire burns. Kim has little doubt that
such reductions are possible in principle, even though they may be
very difficult to achieve in fact. He also frankly admits, however,
that there are aspects of consciousness – specifically, its qualitative,
phenomenal aspects – that cannot be functionally re-conceptualised
and are therefore physically irreducible: ‘Qualia…’ – he remarks –
‘are the “mental residue” that cannot be accommodated within the
physical domain’ (143). According to Kim, the existence of this
mental residue is not a serious threat to physicalism; as he has it,
‘[p]hysicalism is not the whole truth, but is the truth near enough,
and near enough should be good enough’ (146).
This is a striking statement. Drawing on his deep knowledge of the
philosophical debate over themind-body problem in the last decades,
Kim constructs a powerful argument in support of reductive physic-
alism. But a theory of consciousness that fails to account for those
1 The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 129–52.
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aspects of it that wemost cherish and care about (surely, it is the pain-
fulness of pain that we seek to avoid!) has failed to grasp something
essential to its object of investigation. One does not need to be an
old fashioned Hegelian or a Bradleyan idealist to recognise that
‘Das Wahre ist das Ganze’ or that ‘no partial truth is really quite
true’: unless all aspects of a given phenomenon (consciousness or
anything else) are accounted for, we can’t be sure that we have
explained it correctly. Hence, there is at present still room open for
arguing that the future for the philosophy of mind cannot be just
that of labouring the details of a physicalist theory of the mental,
but it must also be that of inquiring further into the very nature of
consciousness and the metaphysical reliability of the physicalist
framework.
The papers collected in this volume provide in depth-explorations
of the nature of subjectivity, the phenomenological structure of the
self, its status as a metaphysical entity, its mode of interaction with,
and existence within, a physical universe. As it should be, they
display a variety of different perspectives and basic philosophical
commitments. Taken together, they reflect not solely the systematic
but also the historical complexity of the issue. The names of,
among others, Plotinus, René Descartes, Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, William James, and Edmund Husserl
figure prominently in several of the following discussions as those
of thinkers who still have much to contribute to the contemporary
debate: as masters to be learnt from rather than, as is too common
in the analytical literature, as sparring-partners who can be easily
defeated.
The articles were originally presented at a conference organised at
the University of Edinburgh to honour the work and philosophical
legacy of Timothy L. S. Sprigge (1932–2007), former Professor of
Logic and Metaphysics (1979–1989) in that same University and
author of insightful works in the philosophy of mind and in speculat-
ivemetaphysics. His original combination of panpsychism and absol-
ute idealism – the theory that reality is a single whole that appears in
the guise of a plurality of monad-like centres of experience – is a nice
alternative, if not an antidote, to the scientistic physicalism that, as
Kim observes, ‘shaped’ the debate over the mind-body problem in
the last decades and that threatens to become the default position in
contemporary philosophy of mind. Systems of revisionary metaphy-
sics run counter to established assumptions, and rightly so; at the very
least, they are an invitation and a challenge to further inquiry.
Neither the conference nor this volume would have been possible
without the help of several persons and institutions. The Editors
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wish to acknowledge the help received from the Royal Institute of
Philosophy, the University of Edinburgh, the British Society for
the History of Philosophy, the Mind Association and the Scots
Philosophical Association. A special word of thanks goes to Andy
Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Leemon McHenry and Dory Scaltsas for
their encouragement and constant support.
The Editors
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